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Abstract:  In this paper, we analyze the effects of religious identity – defined both as personal 
identification with a religious tradition and institutional ideas on the provision of 
public goods – on attitudes toward central government. We explore whether 
citizens belonging to collectivist rather than individualist religious denominations 
are more likely to evaluate their central government positively. Moreover, we 
explore whether adherence to collectivist norms of economic and political 
organization leads to a positive evaluation of central government. Surveys were 
conducted in Russia and Israel as these countries provide a mosaic of three major 
world religions – Judaism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Sunni Islam. The information 
gathered also allows us to study whether attitudes towards religious institutions 
such as the Russian Orthodox Church, the Chief Rabbinate in Jerusalem, the 
Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, and the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in Israel 
are able to predict positive attitudes toward centralized forms of governance. We 
find strong support for the proposition that collectivist norms and an institutional 
religious identity enhance positive attitudes towards central government.  
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Because the provision of public goods is a key state function, it is crucial that governments 
understand citizen perceptions of its adequacy, perceptions that are all influenced by 
religious affiliation, but differently according to denomination. In particular, the effects of 
religion on individual welfare preferences have implications for intergovernmental 
relations and hence perceptions of centralization (Greif 1994). Protestantism and Judaism 
on the one hand are defined as individualist religions; that is, they prioritize individual 
profit over collective welfare, leading individuals to designate the market rather than the 
state as the main source of their personal rents. Islam, Roman Catholicism and Eastern 
Orthodoxy, on the other hand, are defined as collectivist religions: the material interests of 
the community are normatively more significant than those of individuals, so the state 
becomes the main source of personal rents.1 Citizens are more likely to evaluate central 
governments positively, if their religion is collectivist because their preferred level of local 
public goods is higher and thus more likely to be provided by a centrally financed local 
government. Conversely, citizens are more inclined to evaluate central governments 
negatively, if their religion is individualist, because their preferred level of local public 
goods is lower and hence more likely to be delivered by the local government without 
transfers from the administrative center. 
Religious affiliation alone, however, cannot sufficiently explain why religion makes 
some citizens to like or dislike central government more than others. Rather, this variation 
is the result of religious identity, defined here in terms of both institutional ideas on the 
provision of public goods (institutional religious identity) and personal identification with 
a distinct religious tradition (personal religious identity). Whereas institutional religious 
identity implies that individuals view their religion through the lenses of its respective 
                                                          
1 The relation between collectivist religions and community, on the one hand, and individualist religions and 




institutions – whether church, rabbinate, or waqf - personal religious identity suggests that 
a community is an aggregation of individual interests.  
The more strongly citizens identify with a collectivist religion, the more local public 
goods they are going to demand from the central government, which they treat as sine qua 
non components for community stability and cohesion. Conversely, the more strongly 
citizens identify with an individualist religion, the fewer local public goods they are likely 
to demand from the central government because they see individual responsibility and 
personal work as conditions for community cohesion. Religious identity is therefore 
important for governance, because it motivates citizens to favor or oppose dependence on 
local public goods and thereby shapes their beliefs about a stronger or a weaker central 
government. Whereas institutional religious identity tends to favor larger and more 
centralized governments, personal religious identity leads to smaller and more 
decentralized governments.   
Based on the aforementioned observations, we make two assumptions: (i) what 
matters is whether public goods provision meets the preferences of its recipients, and (ii) 
recipient preferences are significantly shaped by religious identity. We empirically test 
these conjectures using survey data on citizen perceptions of the delivery of local public 
goods collected in multifunctional centers that provide state and municipal services 
(MFCs) in the cities of Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi in Russia and in the city 
administrations of Netanya and Nazareth in Israel. These survey data encompass two 
types of administrative systems: those in which local governments are internally 
accountable to the center (Russia) and those in which local governments are externally 
accountable to citizens (Israel).  We therefore expect our data to also effectively capture the 
differences between local governments whose political mandate and financial stability rely 
completely on central government approval and support, and local governments that are 
directly elected by the people and enjoy a higher degree of financial autonomy from the 




indirect approval of the central government; in the Israeli case, we see it as predictive of 
disapproval. 
Our selection of Russia and Israel is particularly valuable in that it provides a 
mosaic of three major world religions – Judaism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Sunni Islam, 
thereby allowing us to capture the linkages between religious identity, public goods 
preferences, and intergovernmental relations across two different administrative systems 
with varying degrees of centralization. The Russian cities in which we collected data are 
primarily Eastern Orthodox and thus a very good venue for testing the effects of Russian 
Orthodoxy on centralization. In Israel, on the other hand, we leverage Israel’s 
multiconfessional nature to test whether different religions generate different attitudes 
toward the central government within the same state. We also account for variation within 
Eastern Orthodoxy by including Russian Orthodox respondents in the Russian cities 
sampled and Greek Orthodox respondents in Nazareth.  
Our conceptual framework assumes that communities are better venues than 
markets or states for tracing the religious roots of public administration and public goods 
provision. Bowles and Gintis (2002), for example, argue that communities are much better 
at enforcing norms because trust, mutual support, and ongoing social relationships correct 
for informational asymmetries that can lead to market failures and free-riding in central 
bureaucracies. If free-riding is punished more and altruism is rewarded more in 
communities because of information revelation, then the same condition will hold for the 
delivery of public goods by local administrations. It is thus more efficient to study the 
effects of religious identity on centralization at the local level. 
The strength of the paper is to provide new theoretical and empirical findings on 
the study of religion and economics. First, our findings complement the literature on 
religious collectives as economic systems and provide further insights into the relation 
between religious identity, religiosity, and economic behavior. Second, our analysis 




treating centralization and decentralization as bureaucratic best responses to individual 
preferences for public goods, which are shaped by religious identity.  Finally, by 
examining the relation between local public goods and religious identity in Russia and 
Israel, our investigation provides a conceptual foundation for a comparative study of 
intergovernmental relations under different types of religious norms and economic 
systems.2 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines our theoretical framework on 
religion, public goods, and centralization. Section III describes the data collected in 
Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi (Russia) and Netanya and Nazareth (Israel). Section IV 
outlines our empirical strategy, Section V reports our results, and Section VI presents our 
conclusions. A structured discussion on the politics of intergovernmental relations and the 




The theory of club goods (see, e.g., Gilles and Scotchmer 1997) is extremely useful for 
understanding the relation between religious identity and local public goods; it allows 
decentralization to be linked to the efficient delivery of common pool resources by any 
religious collective.3 If the religious collective is treated as a club and the goods that it 
offers to its members as club goods, then administrations can be also modeled as quasi-
clubs that derive authority from the religious tradition shared by the majority. For 
example, Berman (2000) argues that the structure of the ultra-Orthodox kibbutz is very 
explicit about the use of observance and dietary prohibitions on the haredim as extreme-
form taxes on secular activity outside the collective.  Accordingly, the opportunity cost of 
                                                          
2 For a discussion on governance and reform in Russian and Israeli cities, see the Appendix.  
3 Their theory of club goods suggests that the provision of local public goods is efficient under the condition 
that citizens preserve the opportunity to conclude labor contracts in neighboring localities. Such is certainly 




secular life decreases, and members of ultra-Orthodox communities socialize with other 
members and produce positive externalities for their collectives, such as higher fertility 
rates. If local public goods are treated as club goods shaped by religious identity, then the 
distinction between contractual and hierarchical public goods reflects the individualism-
collectivism divide in intergovernmental relations.4 
From this perspective, contractual and hierarchical public goods are bureaucratic 
best responses to citizens and corner equilibrium solutions for collectivist and 
individualist local governments, respectively. Multiple intersections of religion and 
centralization lead to different equilibrium solutions that systematize the types of local 
governments and explain how religious identity leads to different levels of public goods 
provision in centralized and decentralized states.  
TABLE 1: RELIGION AND CENTRALIZATION 
 Type of religion 
Centralization  Collectivist Individualist 
External accountability Solidary public goods Contractual public goods 
Hierarchical bargaining  Competitive  public goods Complementary public goods 
Informal autonomy  Complementary public goods Competitive  public goods 
Internal accountability Hierarchical public goods Solidary public goods 
In collectivist local administrations ,C C C CHierarchical Complementary Competitive Solidaryt t t t≥ ≥ ≥  whereas in 
individualist local administrations .I I I IContractual Complementary Competitive Solidaryt t t t≤ ≤ ≤  Hence, as these 
inequalities of local public goods thresholds indicate, citizens of an individualist society 
are better off with an independent local government, while citizens living in a collectivist 
society may be better off with a vertically monitored local government. A collectivist local 
government that is accountable to a central government (internal accountability) is also 
likely to deliver hierarchical public goods because its mandate depends completely on 
                                                          
4 In their study on public goods provision in rural India, Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) argue that if one 
compared to other minority groups such as Muslims or Christians, Scheduled Castes received more public 
goods in 1991 than in 1971.4 They contend that independence from the politics of the Congress Party and the 
emergence of local representative institutions increased this provision to Scheduled Castes, which explains 
the relative asymmetries with respect to Scheduled Tribes. They also argue that compared to British or local 




intergovernmental transfers from the federal center, with which it must bargain for 
financing for its mandate to deliver competitive public goods. Its bargaining policy space 
is thus constrained by its financial dependence and the threshold needed to meet very 
high expectations, so that it must seek external resources to preserve its mandate and stay 
in power. The existence of complementary public goods as an equilibrium solution hence 
implies that under informal autonomy, collectivist local bureaucrats are inclined to deliver 
public goods that do not violate the monitoring rules imposed by the central government 
so as not to risk a reduction in intergovernmental transfers to their budget. 
This typology suggests that religious identity shapes preferences for the provision 
of public goods. Furthermore, people belonging to individualist religions (Protestantism, 
Judaism) are less inclined to demand more public goods compared to people belonging to 
collectivist religions (Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Islam). It is argued that 
collectivist religions induce a higher demand for public goods to citizens, relative to the 
market wage. The distribution of social welfare to the poor by religious institutions occurs 
on the basis of central planning in collectivist religions and market efficiency in 
individualist religions. Hence, the poor in individualist religions are less dependent on 
social welfare provision by religious institutions compared to the poor in collectivist 
religions; their opportunity cost of unemployment is much higher. The hierarchical 
structure of the Eastern Orthodox or the Roman Catholic monastery induces higher free-
riding and persistent inequality, which is not the case in the Jewish kibbutz or the 
Protestant parish. The provision of public goods by local governments is a good proxy that 
operationalizes this dichotomy. Centrally financed public goods provided by local 
governments reflect the effects of collectivist institutional legacies on intergovernmental 
relations. A similar observation holds for the effects of individualist institutional legacies 
on the provision of locally financed public goods. Thus, religion shapes citizen preferences 
for public goods (high in collectivism, low in individualism) that define the tenure horizon 




biased toward central control in collectivism: collectivist central governments cannot risk 
their perspective by granting autonomy to local governments. The reason is that they face 
a higher relative threshold set by citizens. On the contrary, individualist central 
governments face a lower threshold for the delivery of public goods and thus they can 
afford local government autonomy without jeopardizing their own survival in office.  
On the other hand, an individualist local government that is accountable to citizens 
(external accountability) is likely to deliver contractual public goods in order to stay in 
power because citizens can replace an externally accountable local government through 
elections or demonstrations. As a result, individualist local bureaucrats with informal 
autonomy from the central government are more incentivized to deliver beyond what 
their mandate requires because there is no formal monitoring mechanism to inflict a costly 
punishment for excessive spending. They are thus likely to compete with the central 
government in the provision of local public goods. Individualist local bureaucrats under 
hierarchical bargaining are also likely to reduce the volume of local public goods directed 
to citizens at the expense of the central budget and thus deliver complementary public 
goods. 
In general, hierarchical bargaining favors the collectivist local bureaucrat, whereas 
informal autonomy favors the individualist local bureaucrat that must meet a high public 
goods threshold.  The first equilibrium is exemplified by the European Union integration 
paradigm in which EU regions obtain further competencies at the expense of their 
respective nation states. The second equilibrium is typified by Russia’s bureaucratic 
capacity during the 1990’s transition period when the federal center was co-opted by 
regional leaders and private business groups. Local bureaucracies’ provision during this 
era of public goods complementary to those offered by the federal government may also 
be explainable by religion. Under Putin, local governments combine a collectivist religion 
(Eastern Orthodoxy) with internal accountability in the administration to deliver 




informal autonomy from the central administration, adopt an intermediate equilibrium 
solution that combines complementary public goods for Sunni Muslim and Christian 
(Greek-Orthodox and Eastern Catholic) local governments with competitive public goods 
for Jewish local governments.  
The least desirable equilibrium solution for either individualist or collectivist local 
governments and their citizens is solidary public goods, which in societies dominated by 
individualist religion represent the most extreme form of underfulfillment in the delivery 
of contractual public goods. In these societies, such delivery failure is seen as both morally 
reprehensible and a reducer of optimal wages. In societies dominated by a collectivist 
religion, in contrast, although the provision of solidary public goods is also seen as 
underfulfillment of hierarchical public goods, it is assumed to indicate a  lack of 
hierarchical coordination that entails welfare losses for citizens.  
Overall, therefore, contractual public goods incentivize citizens to higher levels of 
labor effort, while hierarchical public goods lead to less labor effort and thus lower market 
wages. That is, citizens work less not only because the local administration delivers more 
with respect to their initial endowment but because the marginal rate of substitution 
between hierarchical public goods and private endowment is 




≥ ⇒ ≥  
where cMU is the marginal utility of contractual public goods, hMU is the marginal utility 
of hierarchical public goods, and wMU  is the marginal utility of market wage. As a result, 
an individualist minority in a collectivist society receives a lower than expected wage and 
more than expected public goods, whereas a collectivist minority in an individualist 
society receives a higher than expected wage and less than expected public goods. This 
observation justifies the definition of local administration as a quasi-club in that the 




the majority. Although minorities are not formally excluded, they are certainly not taken 
into account when local bureaucrats decide on their best response.  
The above observations can be formulated as the following proposition:  
Proposition 1 
Citizens perceive collectivist local administrations as effective if ),C C Ci Canonical Complementaryt t t ε∈ −  
and ineffective if , .C C Ci Competitive Solidaryt t tε ∈ +    
Corollary 1 
Citizens perceive individualist local administrations as effective if 
,I I Ii Contractual Competitivet t t ε ∈ +  and ineffective if ( , .I I Ii Complementary Solidaryt t tε ∈ −    
Proof: If a collectivist local administration delivers less than CComplementaryt ε− so that 
 and , ,C C C C CComplementary Competitive Solidaryt t tσ ε σ ε < − ∈ +  where 
Cσ is the public good delivered by a 




<  and the people will demand that the 
current hierarchy be dissolved and replaced with an independent local government that 
provides contractual public goods. Similarly, if an individualist local administration 
provides more than ICompetitivet ε+  so that  and ( , ],
I I I I I
Competitive Complementary Solidaryt t tσ ε σ ε≥ + ∈ −  









=  and the people will demand the replacement of an independent local 
government with another that is more market driven. It also follows that when a 
collectivist hierarchy that delivers more than is expected is replaced with a more efficient 
hierarchy that delivers less, decentralization incentives will prevail. On the other hand, in 
an individualist context, ineffective local governments are always replaced with other 
independent local governments, meaning that decentralization is always a much more 




Based on the above assumptions, we formulate a corresponding set of hypotheses. 
First, we assume that under collectivist religions, religious identity has positive effects on 
attitudes toward centralization because dependence on hierarchical rather than 
contractual public goods makes citizens more willing to express a positive view of their 
central government. At the same time, the low opportunity cost of centralized social 
welfare in collectivist economies results in the absence of a thriving private sector and thus 
preserves the hierarchical relationship between citizens and the state. We express this 
assumption as our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 
Citizens who identify strongly with collectivist rather than individualist religions are likely to 
evaluate their central government positively. 
Corollary 1 
Citizens that prefer centralized distribution of social welfare are more likely to evaluate their central 
government positively.  
The next hypothesis implies that citizens who are more likely to have collectivist 
normative beliefs and thus abide by their central government’s decisions. It also suggests 
that pressure for the delivery of hierarchical public goods undermines local governments’ 
capacity to bargain with the center and thus minimizes informal autonomy in financial 
management at the local level.  Hence, in collectivist, as opposed to individualist, societies, 
local governments are always seen as extensions of the central government, which 
suggests the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 
Citizens with collectivist rather than individualist norms are likely to evaluate their central 
government positively.  
The distinction between individual identity and collective ideas about the provision of 
public goods is important for understanding the effects of religious identity on 




and Roman Catholicism is synonymous with isolation, legalized punishment in case of 
deviation, and personal freedom that precludes state intervention into such private affairs 
as family, income, and career development; faith in Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam is 
inherently defined by communal life and its institutions. These institutions, although more 
centralized in Eastern Orthodoxy and more decentralized in Islam, constitute the core of 
religious life for all individuals no matter whether or not they attend church or mosque. In 
individualist religions, faith is private, so citizens with individualist normative beliefs 
treat government as an obstacle to their self-fulfillment. In collectivist religions, however, 
faith is public, so citizens with collectivist normative beliefs regard it as a complement, 
leading to the following assumption: 
Hypothesis 3 
Institutional religious identity matters positively for citizen perceptions of centralization.  
Corollary 3 
Personal religious identity has negative effects on citizen perceptions of centralization.  
Religious institutions constitute prototypes for the production of social welfare norms 
intended for the protection of the poor. A positive evaluation of the social welfare activity 
of religious institutions suggests a higher dependence from public goods and a lower 
socio-economic status. Citizens that favor religion as a set of institutions advancing the 
central coordination of charity are more inclined to rely on the institutional capacity of the 
central government. The logic is similar with that on the effects of religion on 
intergovernmental relations. Approval of the centralizing authority of religious 
institutions in the provision of charity to the poor implies a positive attitude toward the 
provision of centrally financed public goods by local governments. In collectivist religions 
religious institutions matter more for charity purposes than in individualist religions. On 
the contrary, personal religious identity is linked with market institutions in the delivery 
of social welfare and thus a lower threshold of local public goods provided by 





 The data was collected during the 2010–2011 academic year by distributing survey 
questionnaires to citizens visiting the multifunctional centers that provide state and 
municipal services in the cities of Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi in Russia, and in the city 
governments of Netanya and Nazareth in Israel. We excluded citizens under 18, as well as 
nonresidents of each city. Although participation was voluntary, approximately one third 
of randomly approached respondents agreed to fill out our questionnaire. In Russia, 
however, many elderly people were unable to fill out our questionnaire because of bad 
health or illiteracy. Moreover, because men were usually at work during the opening 
hours of local administrations (or if present, were in a bad mood), women ended up 
comprising the majority of our Russian respondents.  In Israel, the questionnaires were 
distributed primarily at the tax and water departments of the Netanya and Nazareth 
municipal governments, which were the only two departments in either city 
administration that had continuous opening hours for the public.  The representativeness 
of our sample has definitely been affected by the introduction of electronic governance 
into service distribution.  
The choice of Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi as Russian fieldwork sites provides 
useful quantitative evidence for the relation between the Russian Orthodox lower middle 
class and its administrative state. Similarly, the choice of Netanya and Nazareth as 
representative sites for the upwardly financially mobile Jewish sector and the moderate 
Arab sector, respectively, is likely to offer valuable insights into the influence of religious 
traditions on local government evaluation in a multiconfessional state that has been 
plagued by religious conflict since its very establishment. 
1. Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is a measure of how people evaluate the government, phrased as 




positive, 4=positive, 3=neutrally, 2=negatively, 1=very negatively). The question was 
posed this way to overcome possible self-censorship obstacles when asking Russian 
citizens directly for their opinions of the federal government. Figure 1 reports the 
distribution of the answers. The Russians seemed to be less happy with political authority. 
In Table 2 we report differences between the cities comparing only the mean value. People 
in Sochi are most resentful toward the state while people in Netanya have the most 
appreciation for their state agencies. On the other hand, Israeli respondents overall have 
less appreciation for their local governments5 than do the Russian respondents. The 
Jewish-Arab difference is of course crucial in that respect. 


















                                                          
5 How do you evaluate the provision of services by the local government? (5=very positive, 4=positive, 





2. Key Independent Variables 
1. Religious Denomination 
Whereas the majority of our Russian our respondents are Eastern Orthodox, in 
Israel, the Jewish majority is complemented by a significant share of Muslims and 
Christians, primarily Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox (see Figure 2). The Eastern 
Orthodox respondents in Russia attach greater significance to their religious affiliation 
than do the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian respondents from Israel. Two other religious 
groups in Russia that feel very strongly about their religious tradition are Armenians and 
Jews. The Jewish respondents in Israel constitute the most religiously conscious group in 
our sample, with a monotonically decreasing level of religious consciousness for Muslims 
and Christians. In Netanya, Oriental Jews outnumber European Jews by a small margin, 
whereas in Nazareth, Sunni Arabs are the clear majority. It is also worth noting that the 
number of Nazarene respondents identifying themselves as Israeli Arabs slightly exceeds 
those identifying themselves as Palestinians, and Christians appear to defend their Israeli 
identity much more consistently than their Muslim counterparts, who seem split between 








































Based on this information we develop a dummy variable for collectivist denomination. 
The following denominations appear in this category (Orthodox, Muslim, Druze, 
Armenian, and Catholic). Protestant and Jewish are classified as individualist (value 0).6 
To avoid too many missing values we classify atheists also as individualist. Islam and 
Eastern Orthodoxy are classified as collectivist religions because their respective 
theological traditions prioritize equality and social justice over personal freedom and 
material success.7 Protestantism is defined as an individualist religion because it treats 
social welfare as an extension of civil rights and individual self-determination. What 
distinguishes Protestantism from Roman Catholicism is the merit-based individual path to 
self-fulfillment in the former versus the contractual reciprocity required for public goods 
                                                          
6 We dropped 3 individuals in Netanya who were classified only as Christians instead differentiating 
between Protestants and Catholics.  
7 It is the distribution of resources in religious collectives and the individual steps required toward salvation 
that make theological traditions important for political economy. For example, whereas Eastern Orthodoxy 
stresses commitment to internal hierarchies as key to individual happiness, Islam focuses on the 




provision in the latter. In Judaism, commitment to collective welfare is constrained by 
individual responsibility for violation of religious norms (Abramitzky 2008). In fact, the 
differences in the sectarian organization of Pharisees and Essenes suggest that historically 
Judaism has been both a moral critic of the state (Pharisees) and a Platonic collective that 
teaches abstinence from individual property (Essenes). The modern Israeli kibbutz 
embodies the tradeoff between these ancient Judaic traditions; that is, a lack of private 
property and provision of social insurance that matches the opportunity cost of market 
wage (Abramitzky 2008). 
2. Collectivist Norms 
To substantiate the Weberian hypothesis on the effect of normative beliefs on the 
evaluation of government, our survey included a multi-response question about 
governance:   
What should be the main task of the federal, regional, and local administration?  
Social aid and well-being of the people. 
Protection and implementation of civil rights (property, fair trial, freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, etc.).    
Market and trade regulation.  
Development and reinforcement of the state.  
 
We assume the following ordering from collectivism to individualism: development and 
reinforcement of the state (2) > social aid (1) > market and trade regulation (-1) > civil 
rights (-2). As this was a multiple-response question we have weighted them in line with 
the values in parentheses. When developing the index, these values were added for those 
individuals who provided multiple answers.  In the Russian and Middle East context the 
term ‘regulation’ is perceived to be similar to neoliberalism or free market economy, hence 
we checked the results by re-weighting market and trade regulation as (-2) and civil rights 




statistical significance hardly changes in the estimations and the marginal effects are even 
slightly larger.  
3. Institutional Religious Identity 
Religious institutions matter for social welfare activity because one of the primary 
goals of any religious tradition is to alleviate human suffering among its members, 
especially to relieve the poverty and illness that characterize both advanced and 
developing societies. Based on our respondents’ religious affiliations, we identify four 
major religious institutions: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Chief Rabbinate of 
Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, and the Greek-Orthodox Church of Jerusalem. 
Among the Russian respondents, the Russian Orthodox Church scores highest, whereas 
among the Israeli respondents, the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf is relatively more popular than 
the Chief Rabbinate or the Orthodox Patriarchate. In terms of our distinction between 
hierarchical and contractual public goods, the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Jerusalem Islamic Waqf are much more likely to meet the demands of a collectivist society 
than the Greek-Orthodox Church of Jerusalem or the Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem.  
 
4. Importance of Religious Identification 
To better explore our hypotheses we also control for the degree of religious 
identification with the following variable:  How important is religious identification for 
you? (4=very important, 3=important, 2=not so important, 1=not important at all).  
 
5. Social Welfare and Centralization 
The following questions have been used to measure citizens’ preference for 




When you receive social protection and labor/employment services, would you 
prefer to go directly to the state agency or to an intermediary such as the MFC?8 
Only to the state agency.  
Only to the intermediary.  
It is faster with the state agency.  
It is faster with the intermediary.  
No difference.  
 
Whom would you like to provide social welfare and education services, the central 
government or the local government?9 
Only the central government.  
Only the local government.  
It is faster with the central government.  
It is faster with the local government. 
No difference.  
 
For this, we coded answers a and c as 1 and the rest as 0. Interestingly, Russians indicated 
a stronger preference than Israelis for centralized social welfare.  
3. Control Variables  
1. Local Government and Central Control   
To measure satisfaction with the MFCs in Russia, the following question was asked: 
How do you evaluate the overall work quality of the MFC? For Israel the question was: How do 
you evaluate the overall work quality of the local government?10 As Table 2 suggests, Russian 
respondents seem much more satisfied with the provision of administrative services at 
MFCs than are Israelis with the effectiveness of their local governments. It seems that 
Russian MFCs, unlike local governments in Israel, act more as complementary rather than 
competitive institutions to the central government. This finding could intuitively be 
interpreted to mean that Russians see MFCs as a welcome break from Soviet bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, including rampant corruption and delays in the delivery of public goods. 
                                                          
8 Question asked in Russia. 
9 Question asked in Israel.  




Russian respondents seem far more satisfied with the current situation and the presence of 
MFCs in their cities, showing no nostalgia for their encounters with federal and regional 
administrative agencies. A preference for central control thus seems to substitute for a 
preference for administrative services by subnational institutions. Israelis, however, 
manifest a higher level of distrust toward their local governments because they have to 
live with the consequences of informal autonomy; that is, more cronyism, understaffed 
service desks, and central intervention into local economic policy. The conditions of 
institutional reform in Russia also contrast starkly with Israel’s institutional stagnation 
because it is far harder to reform local governments in democracies than in dictatorships. 
Hence, Israeli respondents evaluate their central government as having more competent 
bureaucrats and providing better and more personalized treatment than localized 
governments.  
TABLE 2: PROPORTION OF VARIABLES CONSIDERED 
    Russia Israel Lipetsk Krasnodar Sochi Netanya Nazareth 
Dependent Variable         
Evaluation of Central Government 2.686 3.051 2.882 2.592 2.453 3.121 2.924 
         
Religion         
Collectivist Norms  -0.275 -0.124 -0.046 -0.335 -0.59 -0.063 -0.241 
Religious Identification 2.901 3.078 2.977 2.841 2.846 3.202 2.861 
         
Governance         
Local Government Support 3.963 3.259 4.052 3.805 4.005 3.462 2.891 
Preference for Centralized Social 
Welfare 0.477 0.388 0.409 0.56 0.492 0.361 0.434 
         
Sex         
Women  0.678 0.430 0.679 0.645 0.717 0.455 0.382 
Men  0.322 0.570 0.321 0.355 0.283 0.545 0.618 
         
Age         
Under 20  0.036 0.009 0.055 0.026 0.014 0 0.025 
20-24  0.174 0.041 0.259 0.11 0.11 0.043 0.038 
25-29  0.186 0.129 0.184 0.168 0.21 0.14 0.108 
30-39  0.252 0.282 0.232 0.266 0.27 0.253 0.335 




50-59  0.132 0.194 0.1 0.168 0.141 0.203 0.177 
60 and above  0.056 0.131 0.029 0.084 0.067 0.167 0.063 
         
Education        
Incomplete high  school 0.015 0.041 0.024 0.011 0.007 0.023 0.076 
High school  0.062 0.242 0.08 0.06 0.031 0.203 0.318 
Technical college   0.102 0.052 0.146 0.084 0.05 0.063 0.032 
Secondary special  0.193 0.155 0.28 0.128 0.129 0.146 0.172 
Incomplete higher (3  or 4 years) 
education 0.095 0.107 0.123 0.069 0.081 0.126 0.07 
Higher education  0.533 0.402 0.347 0.648 0.702 0.439 0.331 
        
Employment status 
Civil servant (also  military) 0.132 0.147 0.132 0.128 0.136 0.137 0.166 
Entrepreneur   0.138 0.138 0.044 0.214 0.198 0.103 0.205 
         
No. of observations 1695 459 723 552 420 301 158 
 
Table 2 reveals no surprises regarding the socioeconomic profile of our Russian and Israeli 
samples. Education level follows a similar pattern, with Russians enjoying much higher 
rates of higher education than Israelis. Nevertheless, in our Israeli sample, the monthly 
income distribution is much more balanced than in the Russian sample (see Figures A1 
and A2 in the Appendix). Income inequality is higher in Russia than in Israel (Gini 
coefficient for Israel is 0.358 while for Russia = 0.447). Lipetsk is poorer than Krasnodar or 
Sochi. The same observation holds for Nazareth with respect to Netanya. It is also 
interesting that although in the three Russian cities and Netanya, women outbalance men 
in response rates (roughly two thirds vs. one third in all four cases), in Nazareth, the 
inverse is true. Russian respondents are also much younger than Israeli respondents, 
probably because Russians have always been more expressive about their views, even 
under socialism.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We test our hypotheses using an ordered probit model. The Russian questionnaire 




government only (as in the Israeli survey). However, the use of the Russian word vlast 
clearly indicates that the federal government and its performance are the main issues at 
stake. In addition to the variables introduced in the previous section we also include city 
dummies to control for unobserved characteristics at the city level. First, we take the entire 
data set to explore most of the hypotheses. Table 3 lists the output of six different 
regressions that sequentially increase the number of independent variables as a robustness 
check of our key variables. We first start with simple specifications that control only for 
collectivist religions (specification 1) or collectivist norms (specification 2). City dummies 
are added simply as a control. Next, we add both variables jointly into specification (3). As 
these factors might be driven by religious identification we control for that variable in the 
next set of regressions (4-6). In specification (5) we control for age, gender, and education 
level. Finally, in specification (6) we also test corollary 1: that is, whether citizens who 
prefer centralized distribution of social welfare are also more likely to evaluate their 
central government positively (when controlling for local governance support and 
employment status). The results in Table 3 indicate that the coefficient of the variable 
COLLECTIVIST RELIGION is always statistically significant. The marginal effects 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix indicate that being a member of a collectivist 
religion increases the probability of evaluating the central government positively or very 
positively by around 5 percentage points and very positively by 1 percentage points. 
Similarly, the coefficient for COLLECTIVIST NORMS is also statistically significant in all 
specifications. An increase in the index by one unit increases ceteris paribus the 
probability of providing a positive evaluation of the central government by around 1 
percentage points. These results provide strong support for the proposition that citizens 
who identify strongly with collectivist rather than individualist religions are likely to 
evaluate their central government positively even after controlling for collectivist norms. 
In addition, citizens with more collectivist rather than individualist norms are also more 




centralized distribution of social welfare are more likely to evaluate their government 
positively, which is consistent with corollary 1 and reports a marginal effect of 2.4 
percentage points.  It is worth noting that administrative modernization at the local level 
increases positive views of the federal center, as does a strong preference for the public 
character of local government. In all estimations, local government evaluation is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Moreover, not surprisingly, civil servants 
show the strongest support for the central government.  
TABLE 3: RELIGION, NORMS AND GOVERNMENT EVALUATION 
Dependent Variable: Evaluation of the Government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Religion and Norms 
Collectivist Religion 0.192**  0.187** 0.193** 0.172* 0.201** 
 (0.08)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Collectivist Norms   0.039** 0.038** 0.042*** 0.040** 0.034* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Religious Identification    0.013 0.011 -0.017 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Governance 
Preference for Centralized Social Welfare      0.110** 
      (0.05) 
Local Government Support      0.399*** 
      (0.04) 
Employment status       
Entrepreneur      -0.003 
      (0.08) 
Civil Servant (including the military)      0.151** 
      (0.07) 
Age and Gender       
25-29     -0.073 -0.079 
     (0.08) (0.09) 
30-39     -0.187** -0.170** 
     (0.08) (0.08) 
40-49     -0.092 -0.093 
     (0.09) (0.09) 
50-59     -0.113 -0.140 
     (0.09) (0.10) 
60 and over     -0.124 -0.159 
     (0.11) (0.12) 
Male     -0.028 -0.018 




Education Level       
High School (10-11 years)     0.099 0.123 
     (0.09) (0.09) 
Technical College     0.149** 0.152** 
     (0.07) (0.08) 
Secondary Special     0.146 0.146 
     (0.09) (0.10) 
Incomplete Higher (3-4 years)     0.134 0.163* 
     (0.09) (0.10) 
Higher     0.260 0.381* 
     (0.20) (0.21) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,967 1,967 1,967 1,897 1,885 1,689 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0224 0.0223 0.0234 0.0244 0.0280 0.0589 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference group: age under 20 and 
20-24, incomplete high school (9 years and less) 
 
TABLE 4: INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND GOVERNMENT EVALUATION 
Dependent Variable: Evaluation of Central Government 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Religious Identity  
Russian Orthodox Church 
 
0.268*** 
   
 (0.05)    
Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem  0.242***   
  (0.09)   
Jerusalem Islamic Waqf   0.107  
   (0.13)  
Greek-Orthodox Church of Jerusalem    0.553*** 
    (0.19) 
Religious Identification -0.180*** 0.069 0.047 -0.070 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.17) (0.26) 
Governance 









 (0.07) (0.21) (0.31) (0.60) 
Local Government Evaluation 0.2780*** 0.902*** 0.261** 0.493** 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.19) (0.23) 
Employment status     
Entrepreneur 0.020 -0.099 -0.475 -0.465 
 (0.11) (0.31) (0.38) (0.69) 
Civil Servant (including the military) 0.091 0.280 0.346 -0.816 
 (0.09) (0.25) (0.38) (0.65) 




25-29 -0.131 -0.110 -0.110 0.824 
 (0.11) (0.34) (0.34) (0.99) 
30-39 -0.231** -0.201 -1.007 0.703 
 (0.10) (0.32) (0.44) (1.01) 
40-49 -0.213* 0.018 1.085 0.433 
 (0.11) (0.31) (0.42) (1.00) 
50-59 -0.156 -0.342 -1.146 0.374 
 (0.13) (0.32) (0.58) (1.11) 
60 and over -0.069 -0.368 -1.352  
 (0.17) (0.36) (0.98)  
Male -0.076 0.488** -0.521 -0.490 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.36) (0.53) 
Education Level     
High School (10-11 years) -0.038 0.289 0.522 0.326 
 (0.12) (0.24) (0.46) (0.71) 
Technical College 0.080 -0.148 0.286 -0.160 
 (0.09) (0.34) (0.38) (0.70) 
Secondary Special 0.027 0.702*** 0.146  
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.55)  
Incomplete Higher (3-4 years) 0.261* 0.040 0.531 -0.337 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.42) (0.51) 
Higher 0.335 0.840 0.0002 1.09 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.59) (1.09) 
Income 1.64e-06 -7.40e-06 0.0001** -7.6e-05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lipetsk 0.503***    
 (0.09)    
Krasnodar 0.212**    
 (0.09)    
Observations 1,104 180 69 35 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0519 0.2301 0.1228 0.2511 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference group: age under 20 and 20-24, 
incomplete high school (9 years and less) 
 
Specification (8) looks at Judaism. It outlines certain similarities between Russian 
Orthodoxy and Judaism when the Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem is the dominant religious 
institution fulfilling collective ideas about the provision of public goods. Again the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The quantitative 




the Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem’s social activity produces a 7.7 percentage point increase 
in a positive evaluation of the activity of the central government. There is no competition 
between central and local government in Israel, thus preferences for local or central 
governments emerge as complementary. The higher the coefficient for local government 
evaluation, the more likely that Israeli Jewish citizen evaluations of the central 
government will be positive. In the Jewish sector of Israel, and more specifically in the 
sample collected from the city of Netanya, the government tasks of protecting and 
implementing civil rights and ensuring citizens’ social well-being are more important in 
shaping the positive evaluation of central government than are the tasks of regulating 
market and trade or developing and reinforcing the state. In contrast with the results from 
Russia, here we find that males are more in favor of the central government with a 
marginal effect for evaluating the state positively at 15.1 percentage points.  
Sunni Islam is the focus of specification (9). Our results indicate that a positive 
evaluation of the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf social welfare activity has a positive effect on 
citizen perceptions of the central government. However, the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant. Another interesting observation is that in Nazareth, positive 
evaluation of local government is more likely to generate positive attitudes toward the 
central administrative state of Israel in which Arabs have no particular say. Hence, Arab 
Muslims in Nazareth may treat good local governance as a positive signal by the Israeli 
Jewish central government of its intention not to undermine their autonomy but rather to 
advance self-government in the largest city of the Arab sector. Under conditions of 
informal autonomy, the Jewish sector views local public goods as both competitive and 
complementary to central public goods, whereas the Arab sector sees them as 
complementary only.  
 Next, we look at Arab Christians (Greek Orthodoxy and Eastern Catholicism) in 
specification (10). The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, the most ancient 




of Arab Christians, so the positive evaluation of its social welfare activity by Nazarene 
respondents is a powerful predictor of centralization. The marginal effects are quite large.  
A one unit increase from the mean in the positive evaluation of the Greek-Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Jerusalem’s social activity produces an 11 percentage point increase in the 
probability of a positive evaluation of the activity of the state. In line with each of the 
previous specifications in Table 4, a positive evaluation of the local government has 
positive externalities with respect to how people evaluate the central government.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The division of local public goods into contractual and hierarchical implies that 
religious identity matters for intergovernmental relations and individual preferences for 
public goods. We therefore examine the influence of religious identity on citizen 
preferences by investigating the countries of Russia and Israel, two states with very 
different religious traditions but a similar administrative structure.  While in Russia the 
provision of local public goods is hierarchical, being monitored by both regional and 
federal authorities, in Israel, local governments enjoy informal autonomy from the center. 
Hence, in the face of local government efforts to claim higher levels of spending 
autonomy, local public goods in the Israeli Jewish sector are competitive, whereas those in 
the Israeli Arab (Muslim and Christian) sector are complementary because of local 
government efforts to acquire more extensive administrative boundaries.  
By administering survey questionnaires in the multifunctional centers providing 
state and municipal services in Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi and in local governments in 
Netanya and Nazareth, we were able to provide valuable new insights into the 
relationship between religious identity and centralization in societies with Russian 





In collectivist religions, personal identification with a religious identity involving a 
distinct religious tradition increases central government support. Collectivist norms are 
also positively correlated with a higher support for the central government. Moreover, 
positive evaluations of the social welfare mission of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Russia and the Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, and Greek-
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in Israel predict positive attitudes toward centralized 
forms of governance. There is no difference between collectivism and individualism in 
institutional religious identity. All these dominant religious institutions with their social 
activities fulfill a key role in communicating and dealing with collective ideas about public 
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Governance and Reform in Russian and Israeli Cities 
Local administrations in Protestant and Catholic societies are likely to deliver public goods based 
on social contracts with citizens, which mirror the legalized core of sin and charity that defines 
Roman Catholic and, even more so, Protestant theology in its Lutheran and Calvinist branches. 
Local administrations in Muslim and Orthodox societies, on the other hand, treat public goods 
provision as a guarantee of collective welfare and social justice, meaning that administrative 
effectiveness in collective religions, rather than signaling government ability to abide by prior 
obligations, is a manifestation of government commitment to fight poverty and alleviate 
inequality. Failure to stand by this commitment constitutes the core sin for the Orthodox and 
Muslim collectives and by extension, for the political communities shaped by their normative 
principles. The Israeli administrative state combines elements of both contractual and hierarchical 






Local governments in Russia have passed through multiple phases in their financial dependence 
from Moscow. Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), for example, in a highly accurate analysis, outline the 
perils for public administration and intergovernmental relations generated by Russia’s 
dysfunctional democracy during the 1990s. They also identify asymmetries in bilateral bargaining 
between the federal center and Russia’s many regions, as well as the differential leverage of 
regional governors on intergovernmental transfers, which at that time were formally decided by 
Moscow (Filippov and Shvetsova 1999). In fact, the authors blame Russian local governments’ 
failure to facilitate new firm growth and foster the economy in the same manner as their Chinese 
counterparts on corruption and rent-seeking by local government officials, combined with 
deficient central government oversight.  
Zhuravskaya (2000) further proposes that revenue-sharing agreements with regional 
governments offset any positive effects of Russian local governments’ revenue accumulation and 
thus prevented the creation of a self-sufficient revenue base at the local level. This observation 
underscores how essential fiscal incentives to local governments are for private sector 
development and economic growth in the Russian regions: if localities do not have the formal and 
institutional capacity to collect their own money, they cannot provide public goods efficiently. Yet 
in the 1990s, the creation of a third layer of government in the Russian Federation was expected to 
reduce widespread corruption at the regional level, with additional decentralization thought to be 
the most effective choice for an economic system plagued by highly centralized institutions and 
deficient tax collection. In reality, imperfect central monitoring of regional budgets facilitated the 
emergence of informal fiscal autonomy at the subnational level at the expense of social welfare, 
business, and investment climate and revenue accumulation, particularly for the central 
government (Litwack 2000). In Russia, as Litwack (2000) observes, the standard tradeoff between 
central control and decentralization does not hold true, meaning that the benefits from 
decentralized budgetary management must be combined with a set of centralized distributive 
policies against poverty and inequality. Yet decentralization can only be effective if central control 
is complementary to regional tax autonomy and offsets the welfare effects of private sector 
developments in the regions with more social policy for the weaker income strata of the society. 
The ongoing administrative reforms in the Russian regions, designed by the federal 




World Bank, have resulted in both the transfer of federal competencies to regional authorities and 
competency transfers in the inverse direction (i.e., from regional to federal administrative 
agencies11), all based on bilateral written agreements that are binding for both sides. At the same 
time, the transfer of tax collecting competencies from the federal to regional governments, or from 
regional to city or district administrations, has created a series of multiple principal-agent 
relationships across all levels of Russia’s federative structure. This multiplicity is particularly 
evident in the area of social policy where the pension fund remains part of the federal 
administration but the responsibility for providing special assistance to war veterans and other 
special groups lies with regional governments, who then use federal budgetary means to deliver 
goods through their own administrative channels.  
Russian regional governments, however, are obliged to apprise the federal government of 
their progress toward the goals underlying the functions of subnational government institutions, 
such as local economic development, preservation of constitutional order, rule of law, and unity of 
state power.12 Moreover, federal institutions can take up competencies of the regional 
administration for a temporary period of time in the following cases: (i) natural catastrophe or 
other emergency situation, (ii) indebtedness of the regional budget, or (iii) provision of illegal 
subsidies extracted from the federal budget as part of a competency transfer agreement that grants 
federal powers to a regional administration.13 Hence, contrary to what might be expected from a 
normal federal system, the federal government in Russia is entitled to monitor and evaluate the 
performance of regional governments rather than the other way around. At the same time, the 
obligation of regional governments to report to the Russian President on budgetary 
implementation and policy targets achieved is highly analogous to the report obligations of 
managers to planners under the Soviet system of incentives – both old and new – and central 
planning. The main difference between the 1990’s era and today is that under Putin, the central 
planning of the federal government has been reduced to public administration and excludes small 
                                                          
11 State Duma of the Russian Federation. “On General Principles for the Organization of Legislative and 
Executive State Organs of the Russian Federation Subjects”, Federal Law No. 184, October 6, 1999: Article 26.8 
(in Russian).   
12 Ibid: Articles 26.3.2 and 1. Article 26.3.2 was introduced as an addition to the original text by Federal Law 
No. 284, December 29, 2006 (in Russian). 




and medium production units and larger conglomerates. The implementation of this centralized 
monitoring system, which originates at the federal level, assumes that the federal government is 
much more efficient in resource extraction than its regional, let alone local, counterparts.  
In Russia, however, the emergence of local government institutions in Russia was not 
meant to constrain the mandate of the federal government and reduce its control, a practice 
followed by EU institutions through the principle of subsidiarity. On the contrary, the federal 
government in Russia has taken serious steps toward the modernization of regional and local 
administrations in order to compensate the welfare losses induced by the centralization of all 
major political and economic competencies. This conditionality tradeoff between centralization 
and decentralization is reflected in recent legal initiatives that have come into force as formal laws. 
These latter include budgetary and informational statutes that grant citizens further access to data 
or additional individual and social rights as a mechanism for checking on their local 
governments.14 At the same time, such detailed enumerations of local government functions and 
the rights of citizens at the local level – including declaration by referendum, law-making 
proposals, accountability of city council members, regularity of elections, budgetary discipline, 
and other institutions  of collective action – in no way constitute elements of decentralization.15 
Rather, they are intended to correct or minimize the informational inefficiencies that once 
hampered central control in Russia both under central planning and during the early transition. 
In this manner, modernization as partial decentralization has improved the quality of 
public goods delivered while increasing the monitoring capacity and set of competencies 
transferred to Moscow. Most particularly, separating regional and local politics from competitive 
pressures on public budgeting has neutralized subnational political competition in favor of the 
federal center. Because a substantial portion of regional and local competencies are federal 
competencies delegated to those authorities, the ease with which the center can empower or 
weaken a regional governor or mayor is self-evident, and federal subsidies to regional and local 
budgets serve as a key instrument in Russian intergovernmental relations.16  
                                                          
14 State Duma of the Russian Federation. “On Granting Informational Access to the Activity of State and 
Local Organs”, Federal Law No. 8, February 9, 2009 (in Russian). 
15 State Duma of the Russian Federation. “On General Organizational Principles of Local Self-Government in 
the Russian Federation”, Federal Law No. 131, October 6, 2003 (in Russian). 




The most recent law on local self-government continues the same logic of administrative 
development in Russian intergovernmental relations.17 First, the same system of subsidies that 
preserves regional government dependence on Moscow also holds for the budgets of local 
governments, which are reliant on subsidies from the regional center.18 Second, although the 
provision of state and municipal services may occur formally at the local level, the management 
and financing of this transformation takes place purely on the regional level and is effected 
through  federal budgetary means. Indeed, the emergence of municipal services as a distinct 
category in public goods provision not only signals the hierarchical expansion of the Russian 
government but confirms that higher transparency at lower levels of government increases the 
federal center‘s monitoring capacity.  
These municipal, as well as state, services are provided at multifunctional centers (MFCs) 
designed as autonomous administrative units that interconnect public agencies at all levels of 
government responsible for delivering services to citizens. These centers, whose reach is constantly 
expanding beyond major Russian cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and Kazan,19  
deliver myriad services, ranging from electronic governance (e.g., the introduction of advanced 
informational systems into pension delivery and social assistance) to unemployment bonuses to 
the certification of environmentally friendly businesses.  
In the newly centralized Russian state, therefore, local government has emerged as a new 
but overly constrained actor. On the one hand, it has (often significant) political visibility in the 
system of Russian intergovernmental relations and receives immense budgetary support from 
federal and regional authorities. On the other, the mayor or district head can easily be replaced in 
the case of public mismanagement or administrative failures whose origins actually lie in 
pathologies of central planning far beyond this official’s reach. In that sense, local government 
heads, who fulfill most of the mandates related to their citizenry and receive budgetary support 
for that purpose, are accountable to both their regional and federal counterparts.  
At present, MFCs in the 35 Russian regions number about 50, but this figure is constantly 
growing, with 79 percent of the costs of center creation and maintenance coming from regional 
                                                          
17 State Duma of the Russian Federation. “On the Delivery Organization of State and Municipal Services”, 
Federal Law No. 210, July 27, 2010 (in Russian). 
18 Ibid: Article 2.1. Also see Articles 71–72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.  




budgets and only 21 percent from the federal budget.20 As a result, the responsiveness of local 
administration to citizen demands has increased, and the introduction of private sector practices 
through the single-window system is raising the operational standards for an administrative state 
historically considered archaic, ineffective, and distant from its citizens’ direct needs. In fact, MFCs 
have established a significant precedent on how local governments should work, with reduction in 
transaction and budgetary costs for regional and city administrations, minimization of low-level 
administrative corruption, and efficient pooling of financial resources from all levels of 
government exemplifying the attainment of administrative reform.21 The reinforcement of city 
governments in the provision of public goods is also positive for citizens living in villages or 
remote areas who traditionally never enjoyed the same access to public goods and social services 
as urban residents, particularly during Soviet times.  
Although social welfare services constitute a major percentage of the services delivered in 
MFCs, the common distinction noted in the MFCs visited for this research was that some are 
specialized for social welfare services and others for land privatization and business licensing. 
Obviously, in cities like Lipetsk or Tomsk, where the population is at or below the national 
average living standard, social welfare provision is a first priority; whereas in Krasnodar or Sochi, 
which have a thriving middle class, land privatization, infrastructural development, and licensing 
of new SMEs are the primary MFC focus.  
The administrative reforms in Russian regions take place under conditions of internal 
accountability, making local government leaders highly disposable. That is, with or without the 
regional administration’s consent, the federal center can replace these officials for failure to deliver 
required public goods and social services. Within this context, openness and transparency are used 
more as internal accountability checks and less as efficiency-maximizing constraints on the utilities 
of local and regional administrations. Hence, the federal government is both initial instigator and 
ultimate beneficiary of this modernization process while holding local and regional 
administrations accountable for negative evaluations. The Russian administrative state has thus 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Regional and city bureaucrats interviewed in Lipetsk, Krasnodar, and Sochi constantly emphasized that 








The administrative division of Israel into districts and local governments has been influenced by 
the religious and ethnic conflicts that have been key to its emergence throughout the 20th century. 
Intergovernmental transfers take two forms: (i) earmarked grants used to finance the fulfillment of 
delegated competencies from the center to the localities, and (ii) general grants sent by the 
Ministry of the Interior (Brender 2003).  Brender (2003) focuses on the former by examining 
whether Israeli voters in local elections take into account a mayor’s fiscal performance in deciding 
whether or not to support a candidate. He concludes that fiscal performance had no effect on 
voters’ choices in the 1989 and 1993 elections but played a significant role in the 1998 election for 
three reasons: (i) the influence of the national parties diminished between 1993 and 1998 as the 
quality of public goods and social services became more important,  (ii) the accounting standards 
imposed on localities by the Ministry of the Interior reduced information asymmetries between the 
mayor and the electorate, and (iii) rises in property taxes served as a powerful indicator of a 
mayor’s poor fiscal performance.  
The development of local authorities in Israel is largely the outcome of centralized 
planning and governmental intentionality toward redistribution and immigrant absorption 
(Spielermann and Habib 1976). Not only is positive responsiveness to public goods and social 
services conditioned by high-level human resources and the introduction of private sector norms 
into local governments (Vigoda-Gadot, 2000), but socioeconomic gaps between Jewish and Arab 
communities, Orthodox and secular Jews, or Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews provide the basis for 
institutional and economic partitions within the set of Israeli local governments (Razin 2004). It is 
thus ethnic and religious divisions that make the study of local governments in Israel so important. 
Whereas local governments are the only institutions in which Arab citizens can assume leadership 
and head a community, the central government of Israel allows little policy discretion at the local 
level (Smooha 1980). Rather, the Ministry of the Interior maintains its monitoring mandate over 
local budgets, as well as elections for mayors, counselors, and the current administration (Galnoor 




welfare are in practice regulated by the capital in Jerusalem and that intensive privatization 
policies and tactical outsourcing to private organizations for public goods provisions reveal the 
national government‘s intention to constrain local authorities. This distrust of local institutions has 
most certainly been aggravated by the ongoing conflict that has undermined many efforts for 
further consolidation of subnational self-government (Galnoor 2011).  
Nevertheless, the introduction of nation-wide municipal elections in 1975 facilitated the 
emergence of a strong mayoral system in which formal centralization is offset by informal 
decentralization practices, which, although they meet local authorities’ demands for more policy 
discretion and independence from central government, also tend to generate higher budget deficits 
(Dery 1998). The resulting conflict between the central government‘s political incentives and the 
local governments’ policy implementation incentives has led to an intermediate equilibrium (Dery 
1998): the national center decides on the set of mayoral candidates and the funding available for 
the mayor’s completion of official tasks, and the local authority chooses a spending policy that 
maximizes the mayor’s reelection probability and meets the majority threshold.  
Since the early 1980s, local identity has been further consolidated by the inclusion of Arab 
citizens in the local political process, the emergence of Arab mayors, and the political mobilization 
of the Arab population in the Islamic Movement, Progressive List for Peace, and Democratic Party 
(Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Unlike Jewish local governments, whose political officials reflect the 
power of national parties and the socioeconomic profile of their voters, Arab local authorities 
continue to be defined by religious (Muslim vs. Christian), kinship, and family ties, which 
contributes to the political underdevelopment of the Arab sector and undermines elected officials’ 
incentives for economic and political modernization at the community level (Rouhana and 
Ghanem 1998). Yet local government autonomy is certainly more important for Arabs than for 
Jews, more important for Christians than for Muslims within the Arab cluster, and more important 
for Mizrahi or Orthodox Jews than for secular Ashkenazi Jews within the Jewish cluster.  
Overall, the poor financial performance of local governments can be interpreted in two 
ways: a policy discretion failure that reveals the managerial incompetence of the mayor and local 
bureaucracy or a central coordination failure stemming from insufficient intergovernmental 
transfers and overlapping mandates between ministries in central government (Carmeli and 




outlets for the federal and regional governments and are held accountable for the shortcomings of 
their administrative apparatus, monitoring structures have been less efficient and local 
governments have been shaped more by ethnic divisions, political competition, family, and 
interest groups.22 Likewise, whereas in Russia, the higher level of centralization facilitates local 
public goods provision by enabling regional and federal authorities to replace incompetent local 
bureaucrats, in Israel, individual preferences for more public goods are compensated by local 
government independence and direct replacement by citizens. At the same time, religion 
influences both citizen demand for public goods and the perceived effectiveness of local 
governments in the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, whereas Russian Orthodoxy, Greek 
Orthodoxy, Eastern Catholicism, and Sunni Islam all lead to individual preferences for more 
public goods and local governments that are fully monitored by the center, Judaism generates only 
a moderate demand for public goods and the informal autonomy of local governments from the 



















                                                          
















































































TABLE A1: MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR SPECIFICATIONS 3 TO 6 IN TABLE 3 
  (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)       
Outcome 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Collectivist Religion -0.032 -0.04 0.022 0.039 0.01 -0.033 -0.041 0.024 0.04 0.01 -0.029 -0.037 0.021 0.036 0.009 -0.031 -0.045 0.026 0.042 0.008 
Collectivist Norms -0.006 -0.008 0.004 0.008 0.002 -0.007 -0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 -0.006 -0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.004 0.007 0.002 
Religious Importance      -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
Centralized Social Welfare                -0.016 -0.025 0.012 0.024 0.005 
Local Government Evaluation                -0.058 -0.092 0.045 0.087 0.018 
Entrepreneur                0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0 
Civil Servant (including the military)                -0.02 -0.035 0.014 0.034 0.008 
25-29           0.012 0.016 -0.008 -0.016 -0.004 0.012 0.018 -0.01 -0.017 -0.003 
30-39           0.031 0.04 -0.023 -0.039 -0.01 0.026 0.038 -0.021 -0.036 -0.007 
40-49           0.015 0.02 -0.011 -0.019 -0.005 0.014 0.021 -0.011 -0.02 -0.004 
50-59           0.019 0.024 -0.014 -0.024 -0.006 0.022 0.032 -0.018 -0.029 -0.006 
60 and over           0.021 0.027 -0.016 -0.026 -0.006 0.025 0.035 -0.022 -0.033 -0.006 
Male           0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
High School (10-11 years)           -0.015 -0.022 0.009 0.022 0.006 -0.017 -0.029 0.011 0.028 0.006 
Technical College           -0.022 -0.033 0.013 0.033 0.009 -0.02 -0.035 0.014 0.034 0.008 
Secondary Special           -0.021 -0.033 0.012 0.032 0.009 -0.019 -0.034 0.013 0.033 0.007 
Incomplete Higher (3-4 years)           -0.02 -0.03 0.012 0.03 0.008 -0.021 -0.038 0.014 0.037 0.008 
Higher           -0.034 -0.059 0.015 0.059 0.018 -0.042 -0.089 0.015 0.091 0.025 
Lipetsk 0.013 0.018 -0.009 -0.018 -0.005 0.01 0.014 -0.007 -0.014 -0.004 0.015 0.021 -0.011 -0.02 -0.005 0.082 0.111 -0.069 -0.104 -0.02 
Krasnodar 0.071 0.081 -0.053 -0.08 -0.019 0.069 0.079 -0.052 -0.078 -0.018 0.064 0.075 -0.049 -0.073 -0.017 0.131 0.142 -0.117 -0.133 -0.023 
Sochi 0.108 0.105 -0.084 -0.105 -0.024 0.104 0.103 -0.082 -0.102 -0.022 0.096 0.099 -0.077 -0.097 -0.021 0.193 0.162 -0.172 -0.157 -0.026 
Netanya -0.048 -0.081 0.019 0.083 0.028 -0.052 -0.09 0.019 0.093 0.031 -0.052 -0.093 0.019 0.095 0.031 -0.035 -0.067 0.02 0.066 0.016 
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